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Abstract
Taking a political economy perspective this paper proposes an alternative carbon abatement policy
instrument with significant advantages over existing policy instruments. The key feature of the proposed
carbon securities is that they entitle their owners to a fixed proportion of ex ante unknown total emis-
sions. The total level of carbon emissions is set by the political process after the carbon securities have
been sold. A key benefit of the proposed carbon security is that it creates a group of stakeholders, whose
interest is for a smaller level of emissions and which competes with industries that consume significant
amounts of carbon-based energy. The advantages over existing policy tools include an equilibrium carbon
price closer to the level preferred by voters and a more predictable environmental policy in the presence
of either climate or political uncertainty. (JEL: D72, Q54, Q58)
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1 Introduction
There is strong evidence that to maximize the present value of world income a reduction of
carbon dioxide emissions by at least 10 percent is advisable. Global agreement on carbon
emission reductions has been difficult to come by. The costs of this suboptimal policy choice
are likely in the range of 3 to 6 trillion 2005 US dollars and possibly higher (Nordhaus
(2010b), Keller et al. (2007)).
Industry interests are partially responsible for the failure of governments to pass appropri-
ate climate legislation since the design of environmental policy is subject to pressures from
industrial lobbies.1 An example is the US climate change bill that was eventually rejected in
the Senate in 2010. As a whole the US economy would most likely not be significantly hurt
by moderate carbon abatement, but certain industries - in particular oil and coal - would
be. It is not surprising that these industries mounted a large lobbying campaign to protect
their interests.2 In many countries, there are well financed, influential lobbies which success-
fully represent the interests of industries that benefit from a low level of carbon abatement.
The outcome is frequently the implementation of a policy that deviates from the social wel-
fare maximizing policy and makes concessions to interest groups (Markussen and Svendsen
(2005), Ekins and Speck (1999)).
There are two classes of market-based policy instruments currently used and/or debated
to regulate carbon dioxide emissions: taxes and permits (cap and trade). A large literature
discusses the advantages and disadvantages of these two policy instruments from a variety of
perspectives.3 Keohane (2009) and Metcalf (2009) debate each instrument’s relative merits.
Hahn (2009) discusses the two policy instruments with a focus on how the government
1See for example the essays collected in Stavins (2004).
2In the years 2009 and 2010 firms from the U.S. oil and gas sector spent $321 million on lobbying, while electric utilities
spent in the same period an additional $336 million. (Source: Center for Responsive Politics).
3The idea of using a tax to regulate pollution dates back to Pigou (1920). Tradable permits were first suggested in Crocker
(1966) and Dales (1968).
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would use the revenue generated from each instrument. Goulder et al. (1999) and Bovenberg
et al. (2008) compare taxes and permits in a second-best setting of pre-existing taxes and
industry compensation requirements respectively. Oates and Portney (2003), Stavins (2004)
and Keohane et al. (2002) discuss political economy aspects of policy instruments. In other
related work, Lai (2008) constructs a two-stage lobbying game to explain why some fraction
of permits are typically grandfathered while the remaining permits are distributed through
auctions. Hanley and MacKenzie (2010) use a contest model to analyze the incentives to
rent seek for pollution permits and to analyze the consequences for social welfare.
This paper proposes a policy instrument, that has to our knowledge not been proposed
previously and that we will refer to as carbon securities. A carbon security gives the owner
of the security the right to emit (or to sell this right) in each of the following k periods up
to 1
n
Xj, where Xj is the society’s total desired carbon emissions for period j and n is the
total number of securities sold. The sequence of amounts {Xj}k1 is unknown to any potential
buyer of the security at the time when she has to decide whether she wants to purchase a
security. At the beginning of period j, the political process determines the society’s total
desired carbon emissions, Xj. When choosing Xj the political process takes into account
the voters’ preferences and any contributions from lobbies representing either the interests of
the carbon-using industry or the owners of carbon securities. Our approach to modeling the
political process is inspired by Grossman and Helpman (1994), whose pioneering approach
has been applied to a wide variety of policy issues. In particular, Aidt (1998) uses a common
agency framework to derive the characteristics of endogenous environmental policy.
The main advantage of carbon securities is that they create stakeholders with an interest
in lobbying for low carbon emissions. The idea is that active participation of this group in
the policy-making process counterbalances the lobbying of industries that benefit from a low
level of carbon abatement, in the following referred to as the carbon-using industry. Research
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on lobbying decisions by firms finds that the high fixed costs to begin the lobbying process
is very important (Bombardini (2008) and Kerr et al. (2011)). Once a firm has engaged
in lobbying, they are highly likely to continue. The proposed policy instrument helps firms
overcome the fixed cost of lobbying with the promise of a greater payoff of their pre-purchased
securities. Once purchased, these securities would be sunk capital to the owners. It has been
shown that owners of sunk capital are more willing to pay for lobbying than owners of assets
that can easily to transformed to alternative uses (Marceau and Smart (2003)).
While both emission permits and carbon securities establish property rights, there are
some important differences. Permits give the owner the right to emit a fixed amount of
carbon which is set prior to the sale of the permit. Once permits have been distributed, the
cap is set. Lobbying to decrease the cap and thereby increase the value of the purchased
permits is unlikely to be successful since it would require that the government buys back
permits. As a result, groups which might be interested in higher prices of the permit have lost
the opportunity to lobby for them. Carbon securities entitle the owner to a fixed proportion
of total emissions, which have not yet been set at the time when the securities are sold.
We depart from previous studies in two important ways. First, we propose a new policy
instrument that encourages the formation of a counter-lobby to the existing lobby groups
representing the carbon-using industries. The model suggests that the lobbying process with
carbon securities leads to a carbon price level that is closer to the carbon price level preferred
by the median voter than with a tax or permit system. This is a direct consequence of the
presence of stakeholders with an interest in low carbon emissions. Second, we study the effect
of climate and political uncertainty on the variance of the carbon price. While there is ex
ante uncertainty about the amount of carbon emissions allowed per security, the variance of
the expected carbon price is smaller.
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2 The Model
We compare the performance of a carbon tax and of carbon securities within two period
games. Figure 1 shows a timeline for a two period model in which securities are sold in the
first period and pay one carbon allowance in the second period. For ease of exposition, we
focus on this two period model. An k+ 1 period model with securities that pay k allowances
is a fairly straightforward extension.4
At the beginning of the first period, the government announces the policy instrument of
its choice. If carbon securities are the chosen policy instrument, the government sells the
securities.5 There are m identical carbon-using firms. Carbon securities are either bought by
carbon-using firms or by investors who do not belong to the carbon-using industry. We first
focus for ease of exposition on the benchmark case in which all securities are held by outsiders
to the carbon-using industries and then elaborate on what happens if this is not the case.6
The carbon-using industry and the owners of carbon securities each organize themselves as
a lobby.
In the second period, information about the state of the world, θ, is revealed. The lobby
or lobbies then offer their contribution schedule(s) which are conditional on the carbon price
selected. The government chooses the level of the carbon price that maximizes its welfare.
Then each owner of a carbon security sells her carbon allowance, 1
n
X, to firms required to
hold a carbon allowances equal to their carbon emission in period 2. Below we describe the
stages of the games in more detail starting with the last stage and with a focus on the more
4The k + 1 period model is a repeated game in periods 2 to k. The lobbying game described in this section is the a stage
game of this repeated game.
5The sale of the carbon securities is not explicitly modelled here. Conducting an auction has some well known advantages.
However, all results of the paper also follow thorough if the carbon securities would be sold at a fixed price (which could be
zero).
6The effectiveness of carbon securities as a policy tool depends on the allocation of the carbon securities in the second period.
The benefits of carbon securities increase with the fraction of the securities held for investment purposes (resale) and not for a
firm’s own carbon consumption. See Section 3.5 for more on this issue.
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Figure 1: Timeline
complex game with carbon securities as policy instrument.
Consider period 2 of the carbon securities game. Assume demand for carbon inputs, D,
can be approximated as deterministic. Then total emissions, X, determine the carbon price
via D(p) = X where D is a decreasing function of the carbon price p. The carbon price can
be thought of as a fee to be paid per unit of carbon-emitting input (fossil fuels) used in the
production process. So the cost of using one unit of carbon-emitting input is the sum of the
price of the carbon-emitting input and the carbon price. We limit ourself to the case that
the carbon price is non-negative. With a carbon tax the government sets the price of carbon
p directly by means of a unit tax. For ease of comparison between the tax and the carbon
securities, the government’s choice variable is the carbon price in both scenarios.
We assume that the incumbent government believes that its odd of survival depends on
how close their chosen policy level is with the policy level preferred by voters. Choosing a
carbon abatement policy that displeases many voters decreases the chance to be reelected. At
the same time, contributions from lobby groups can be used to finance campaign spending
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and thereby improve reelection prospects. Based on these considerations, we model the
government’s objective as maximizing its welfare, WG, which is equal to the weighted sum of
campaign contributions and the benefits of choosing a policy level inline with voters’ opinion:
WG(p) = CB(p) + CE(p)− θF (p) (1)
CB and CE are the campaign contributions of the carbon securities holders (B) and the
carbon-using industry (E), respectively, and F is the cost of deviating from voters’ opinion.
The variable θ is the government’s preference variable and describes the weight the govern-
ment gives to campaign contributions relative to the cost of deviating from voters’ opinion.
We assume that ∂F
∂p∂p
> 0 and F has a unique minimum, p∗, the carbon price that the median
voter considers as optimal. While we do not attempt to derive the median voter’s preferences
from micro foundations, one way to think of F and p∗ is as the outcome of a tradeoff between
the cost of climate change and the benefits of a low price of energy. If FCLI is the voter’s
estimate of the cost from climate change and FPOL is her estimate of cost resulting from
carbon abatement policy then
F (p) = FCLI(p) + FPOL(p). (2)
It is natural to think of FCLI as an increasing function of total emission X or alternatively as
a decreasing function of p. Cost resulting from carbon abatement policy, FPOL, increase with
abatement effort and hence with p. F , FCLI and FPOL are illustrated in Figure 4. Note that
if the government was not influenced by interest groups, the government would choose the
level of carbon abatement preferred by the median voter as in a standard Downsian model.7
Here we assume that governments are influenced by interest groups and therefore look at a
second-best equilibrium.
7In a Downsian model with office motivation and a unidimensional policy space the candidates locate at the median ideal
policy in equilibrium (Downs (1957) and Hotelling (1929)).
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Next, consider the lobbying stage of the game. We assume that the firms of the carbon-
using industry are able to organize themselves into a lobby group in order to influence the
political process.
The gross of contributions welfare of the carbon-using industry is
WE(p) = Π(p) (3)
where Π(p) =
m∑
i=1
pii(p) is the total profit of the industry. An individual firm’s profit is
pii(p) where carbon price p is an input price. So an individual firm’s demand for carbon-
based inputs is −pi′i(p) and the industry’s demand is D(p) = −Π′(p) = −
m∑
i=1
pi′i(p) where
we use the prime (’) notation to indicate derivatives with respect to p. The lobby of the
carbon-using industry chooses the contribution function CE to maximize net of contributions
industry welfare: maxCE Π(p)−CE(p). Next, consider the welfare of the owners of the carbon
securities. Initially assume that this group is distinct from the group of carbon-using firms.
However, in Section 3.5 we analyze the model with this assumption relaxed. The gross of
contributions welfare of the owners of carbon securities is the value of the securities in the
second period minus the sale price of the securities in the first period:
WB(p) = −pΠ′(p)− ξn (4)
where ξ is the price that the government sold a security for and n is the total number of
securities. The revenue of the owners of the securities is the product of the carbon price and
the emission quota. The carbon price is determined by the allowance market equilibrium
condition, D(p) = X. Anticipating this equilibrium, the owners of carbon securities expect
their revenue to equal −pΠ′(p). We assume that the owners of the carbon securities are able
8
to organize themselves into a lobby group in order to influence the political process.89
3 Analysis
3.1 A Carbon Tax
When studying the performance of carbon securities we use a carbon tax as the reference
point. Since we assume that the demand for carbon inputs is deterministic, it does not
make a difference whether the carbon price is chosen by the government or whether the
corresponding emission quantity is chosen. Both lead to the same equilibrium.
To find optimal campaign contributions and the equilibrium carbon price level, we use a
standard equilibrium concept that is a natural extension of Bernheim and Whinston (1986)
(see Appendix for details) and focus on truthful strategies.10
Definition 1. A truthful contribution schedule takes the form
Cj(p,Bj) = max[0,Wj −Bj]
where Bj is a constant and j = E,B.
To derive the first order condition characterizing the equilibrium carbon price, take equa-
tion (1), apply the definition of truthful strategy and substitute in the expressions in equations
8In practice, the assumption that a lobby forms is more credible for carbon securities that establish long-term property rights
to carbon emissions since the initial cost of setting up a lobby are more likely offset by benefits of a higher value of carbon
securities. There may also be concerns that ownership may end up being too dispersed. However, even if just some carbon
security holders would form a lobby, the results of Section 3.5 show that a higher carbon price would be implemented.
9In addition to the two lobby groups we consider, one may also think of environmental interest groups. We assume that if
carbon securities were introduced, the lobbying and fundraising efforts of environmental interest groups are likely to either stay
the same or to decrease. Overall, the effect of environmental interest groups is likely to be fairly modest compared to industry
lobby groups.
10In general, there are a large number of equilibria in menu auctions. However, only equilibria supported by so-called truthful
contribution schedules are stable to non-binding communication among players. Also, the best response set to any strategy
played by an opponent includes a truthful strategy(Bernheim and Whinston (1986)). Therefore, we focus in the following on
equilibria supported by truthful contribution schedules.
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(3) and (4). The carbon tax equilibrium carbon price, pT , satisfies
θF ′(p) = Π′(p). (5)
so that marginal campaign contributions equal the weighted marginal cost of deviating
from voter opinion.
Proposition 1. The carbon price under a tax system is lower than the median voter’s pre-
ferred carbon price: pT < p
∗.
The is evidence that supports the position that the pattern predicted by the above propo-
sition is in line with real-world observations. According to Nordhaus (2010b) the current
actual carbon price is approximately $5, while the current social welfare (discounted GDP)
maximizing carbon price is $30 (value in 2010, increasing over time) and the carbon price
needed to reach the 2◦C goal is $59. If the median voter would be more inclined to follow
the Stern Review (Stern, 2007) and its lower discount rate, than the difference between the
actual and the social welfare maximizing current carbon price ($85) would be even larger.
3.2 Carbon Securities
The key feature of a system with carbon securities is that the amount of carbon emissions
allowed per security is determined after the security has been sold. This provides an incentive
for competition among interest groups over the carbon price. With a carbon tax, only the
carbon-using industry has a strong financial incentive to lobby for a carbon price in its favor.
Introducing property rights for emissions creates a counterbalancing force: now there is a
group that has a strong financial interest in lobbying for a high carbon price.
If contribution schedules are truthful, the carbon securities equilibrium carbon price pS
satisfies
10
−pΠ′′(p)
Π′(p)
θF ′(p)
p∗
pT pS
p
Figure 2: The equilibrium carbon price with carbon securities, pS , is higher than the equilibrium price with
a carbon tax, pT .
θF ′(p) = −pΠ′′(p). (6)
The government selects a carbon price that equates the weighted marginal loss from devi-
ating from voters’ opinion with the marginal campaign contributions it receives. Campaign
contributions are from two sources here: the carbon using industry and the carbon security
holders. If the government increases the carbon price, it receives less contributions from the
carbon-using industry and higher contributions from the carbon security holders.
Proposition 2. The carbon price under either system is below the median voter’s preferred
carbon price: pT < p
∗ and pS ≤ p∗. With carbon securities the carbon price is higher than
with a tax: pT < pS.
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 2: the intersection of the solid lines indicates the tax
equilibrium, the intersection of the dashed line and the solid line the carbon securities equi-
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librium. First, consider the tax equilibrium: Marginal campaign contributions, Π′(p) are an
increasing function, since demand for carbon-based inputs, −Π′(p), is a decreasing function.
Weighted marginal loss from deviating from voters’ opinion, θF ′(p), is an increasing function
that intersects with the horizontal axis at p∗, the carbon price preferred by the median voter.
The carbon tax equilibrium price is pT . Second, consider the carbon securities equilibrium:
If demand for carbon-based inputs is inelastic, which will be assumed in the following, then
−pΠ′′(p) > Π′(p) and the carbon securities equilibrium carbon price, pS, has to be higher
than pT .
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Intuitively, the carbon price is higher with carbon securities since the presence of the lobby
of carbon security holders mitigates the influence of the lobby of the carbon-using industry.
The size of the effect depends on θ, on the carbon-using industry’s profit function and on
how sensitive the loss from deviating from voters’ opinion is to carbon price changes.
3.3 Climate and Political Uncertainty
Suppose that there are two political parties and that there is an election between period 1
and 2. One party has a high θ, θH , and the other has a low θ, θL and in period 1 it is uncertain
which party will win the election. Figure 3 illustrates this scenario from the perspective of
period 1 and therefore shows both possible outcomes. If the party with the high θ is elected,
then irrespective of the policy instrument, the abatement level will be fairly close to p∗ since
a party with a high θ has a strong preference for being in line with public opinion when it
comes to carbon abatement policy. If the party with the low θ is elected, then with a carbon
tax a carbon price significantly below p∗ is chosen but with carbon securities the carbon price
11Numerous empirical studies show that demand for carbon-based energy sources is typically inelastic. In the gasoline market,
Knittel (2012) overviews the literature. For natural gas, Davis and Muehlegger (2010) find that residential and commercial
consumption is highly inelastic. Cooper (2003) calculates crude oil demand elasticities for a sample of 23 countries and finds
that both short and long run demand is highly insensitive to price changes.
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Figure 3: The effect of political uncertainty.
is fairly close to p∗. The distance between pSL and pSH is smaller than between pT L and
pT
H . So the period 1 variance of the expected carbon price is smaller with carbon securities
as policy instrument. Thus, a significant advantage of carbon securities is that they make
environmental policy more predictable under this type of political uncertainty.
This result may surprise given that one of the often proclaimed advantages of a carbon
tax is the predictability of the carbon price. In our view this argument ignores the fact that
tax rates can easily be changed when governments or the political situation changes.12
Now assume that there is no political uncertainty but there is considerable uncertainty
about the climate and GW . For very high carbon emissions (low carbon price), there is a wide
range of estimates of the resulting temperature increase and hence the cost of climate change
(Allen et al., 2009). There is less uncertainty about the effect of emitting small additional
12Marsiliani and Renstro¨m (2000) address this time-inconsistency problem in tax policy and suggest tax earmarking as a way
to imposes a constraint on government policymaking.
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pFPOL
F˜
F˜CLI
emissions
F
FCLI
X˜∗ X∗
p∗p˜∗
Figure 4: Uncertain cost of climate change.
amounts of carbon. This situation is illustrated in Figure 4 by two FCLI functions: FCLI
and F˜CLI which converge for very low emissions (high carbon prices) but diverge for high
emissions. The state of the world characterized by F˜CLI can be interpreted as a state with
either low climate sensitivity or efficient geoengineering options.
Suppose that in period 1 it is unknown whether the loss from deviating from voters’
opinion will be characterized by FCLI or F˜CLI . The carbon price the median voter prefers
in period 2 can be either p˜∗ or p∗, the minimizers of F and F˜ , respectively. The state of the
world characterized by FCLI can be thought of as a state with high climate sensitivity and
climate change imposing significant cost.
Figure 5 shows θF ′(p) and θF˜ ′(p) to study the effect of this form of climate uncertainty
on the respective equilibria under the two policy instruments we compare. Since the distance
between pS
F˜ and pS
F , the potential carbon prices with securities, is smaller than between
14
Π′(p)
θF˜ ′(p)
pT
F˜ pT
F
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θF ′(p)
pS
FpS
F˜
−pΠ′′(p)
Figure 5: The effect of climate uncertainty.
pT
F˜ and pT
F , the potential carbon prices with a tax, the period 1 variance of the carbon price
is smaller with carbon securities. So with respect to the possibly most important type of
uncertainty related to carbon abatement policy, the unpredictability of the costs associated
with very high carbon emissions, carbon securities reduce the variance of the carbon price
and thereby make environmental policy more predictable. A more predictable environmental
policy could encourage investment in carbon abatement technology.
3.4 Discussion
This section discusses (i) the performance of carbon securities when some carbon-using firms
purchase carbon securities, (ii) the attractiveness of carbon securities to politicians, and (iii)
the practical implementation and monitoring burden.
If an outsider of the carbon-using industry owns a carbon security, this investor prefers
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a carbon price that maximizes the value of the carbon securities. This changes if a carbon
security is held by an insider of the carbon-using industry. An insider owns carbon securities
for his own consumption of carbon allowances and possibly in addition to that in order to sell
any left over carbon allowances to other firms. The insider prefers an emission quota high
enough so that her own carbon emissions are covered by her carbon allowances. However,
for selling any left over allowances, a high carbon price is advantageous.13
Suppose that of the m identical firms in the industry, a fraction α holds the n securities
and that each of these αm firms holds the same share of the carbon securities. The remaining
firms have to purchase emissions allowances from these αm firms.
Let pT and pS again be the 100% outsider ownership equilibrium prices derived earlier
and pαS the equilibrium price if a fraction α of carbon-using firms owns all securities.
Proposition 3. The equilibrium price if αm firms own the n securities lies between the tax
equilibrium price and the carbon securities equilibrium price with 100% outsider ownership:
pT < pαS < pS.
So with insider ownership and equal shares across firms, the carbon price is between pT
and pS, as illustrated in Figure 6.
The line αΠ′(p)− (1−α)pΠ′′(p) shows the marginal campaign contributions as a function
of the carbon price. For a small α the equilibrium carbon price is close to the carbon securities
equilibrium carbon price, for an α close to one the carbon price is close to the price under a
carbon tax.
A system based on carbon securities performs better with respect to equilibrium carbon
price and the variance of the carbon price than a system based on a carbon tax if at least one
of the carbon-using firms does not purchases a share of carbon securities that is equal to its
share of carbon emission. This superperfect distribution in which all securities are bought by
13Carbon-using firms that do not purchase carbon securities always prefer a carbon price equal to zero.
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Figure 6: The carbon price if some carbon-using firms purchase securities.
carbon-using firms and each firm purchases a fraction of carbon securities that exactly equals
its share of future total emissions is not just highly unlikely to occur in practice but is also
undesirable from the perspective of a politician. The reason is that campaign contributions
are lower for security distributions close to this superperfect distribution.
A scenario in which some securities are held by carbon using firms and some securities are
held by outsiders to the carbon-using industry is not explicitly considered here. This case
is analytically equivalent to the scenario discussed above. It makes no difference if a carbon
using firm purchases a security for investment purposes or if an outside investor purchases
the carbon security for investment purposes. All that matters is what fraction of securities is
held for investment purposes or in other words held with the intent to sell allowances. In the
case of the S02 allowances traded under the EPA’s Acid Rain Program, non-SO2 emitting
entities purchased about 35% of the allowances auctioned between 2001 and 2011. The vast
17
majority of allowances purchased by non-SO2 emitting entities is purchased for investment
(resale) purposes.
Apart from a firm’s inability to perfectly predict its share of carbon emission relative to
everybody else’s emissions, the large total value of carbon securities also makes it unlikely
that a superperfect distribution of allowances would occur. For example, to purchase the
necessary quantity of 15 year maturity securities to cover its emissions, a typically electric
utility company may have to spend an amount comparable to its current total assets.14 15
Just like a permit system, a carbon securities system can be designed so that there is
government revenue from selling or auctioning securities. If securities are auctioned off,
theory suggests that the revenue is equal in size to that of a tax that would generate the
same amount of emissions. If demand for carbon is inelastic, as we assumed throughout,
Proposition 3 implies that government revenue is at least as large and likely larger under the
here proposed policy instrument than under alternative policy tools since the carbon price
would be higher. The monitoring burden of a system based on carbon securities is likely to
be similar to a carbon permit system.
As discussed in Nordhaus (2010a) raising government revenue by setting a price for carbon
has many advantages over standard sources of government revenue such as income, consump-
tion and company taxes. A sale of carbon securities would raise a larger amount of money
upfront than introducing a carbon tax would. If the revenues from the securities sale were
14Consider the following example. In 2010, Southern Co emitted 145 million tons of CO2 and had capital expenditures of $4
billion, operating revenues of $17.5 billion and assets of $55 billion (Source: www.southerncompany.com). Assuming securities
have a maturity of 15 years and the expected carbon price is constant at $30 per ton of carbon over this period, with a discount
rate of 5% the value of the securities Southern Co would have to purchase to cover their emissions is around $45 billion. Buying
one year’s carbon coupons would cost around $4 billion.
15In addition, carbon securities are financial assets with an uncertain future value. The future value of carbon securities
is affected by climate uncertainty, political uncertainty and uncertainty about the demand for fossil fuels. It seems therefore
plausible to anticipate that a significant share of securities would be bought by investment banks and other entities specialized
on investment in assets with uncertain returns.
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used to reduce government debt, this could be a very helpful first step back towards fiscal
sustainability.
A question left for future research is what the optimal maturity of carbon securities
is. Having carbon securities just pay one carbon allowance is probably not good for lobby
formation, but having carbon securities pay carbon allowances for forever may also have some
disadvantages.
4 Concluding Comments
A carbon policy instrument which allows a group of stakeholders to be developed whose
interests are in reducing the carbon emissions will bring the equilibrium emissions closer
to the level preferred by voters. From a political economy perspective, a carbon security
instrument can incentivize these stakeholders to lobby the government because it will increase
the value of their assets. These securities provide the owner with a fraction of the yet to
be decided carbon emissions quota. This paper shows that carbon securities have a number
of desirable properties. Importantly, if political uncertainty and climate uncertainty are
important concerns, carbon securities can make carbon abatement policy more predictable.
A key advantage of carbon securities in this respect may be that they are a very attractive
policy instrument from a politician’s point of view.
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A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Equilibrium Carbon Price with a Carbon Tax
Definition 2 (Equilibrium with a Carbon Tax). An equilibrium of the tax game is a contri-
bution function CE(p) and a carbon price p such that CE(p) and p are an equilibrium of the
lobbying stage of the carbon securities game; that is
(i) the contribution function maximizes the joint welfare of the lobby’s members given the
carbon price p
(ii) carbon price p maximizes the government’s objective taking the contribution function as
given
The following proposition states the necessary and sufficient conditions for an equilibrium
of the lobbying stage of the tax game.
Proposition 4. (C0E, pT ) is an equilibrium of the lobbying stage if and only if
a) C0E is feasible
b) pT maximizes CE(p)− θF (p)
c) pT maximizes WE(p)− θF (p)
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d) there exists a pE that maximizes WG(p) such that C
0
E(p
E) = 0
Proof. The proposition follows immediately from Lemma 2 of Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
The first condition of the proposition is a standard feasibility condition. The second con-
dition requires that the carbon price is optimal for the government since CE(p) − θF (p) is
the government revenue. The third and fourth conditions together state that the lobby’s
contribution schedule has to be optimal.
Proof of Equation (7). Equation (7) is derived from Proposition 4. The first order condition
is unique if the contribution schedule is truthful. Note that condition (b) of Proposition 4
simplifies to
WE(p)−BE − θF (p) (7)
where BE is a constant. Therefore, conditions (b) and (c) of Proposition 4 lead to the
same first order condition. Second, to see that the equilibrium carbon price pT satisfies
θF ′(p) = Π′(p) start with either condition (b) and (c) of Proposition 4 and replace WE with
the expression in (4). This yields
Π(p)−BE − θF (p) (8)
Therefore, the FOC characterizing the equilibrium of the tax game is θF ′(p) = Π′(p).
Proof of Proposition 1. Since p ≥ 0 is an input price Π(p) is a decreasing function of p:
Π′(p) < 0. This implies that pT has to be in the range of p in which it holds that θF ′(p) < 0.
Since F by assumption has a unique minimum, p∗, it follows that θF ′(p) < 0 for all p < p∗.
Therefore, pT < p
∗.
A.2 Equilibrium with Carbon Securities
Definition 3 (Equilibrium with Carbon Securities). An equilibrium of the carbon securi-
ties game is a set of contribution functions {CE(p), CB(p)} and a carbon price p such that
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{CE(p), CB(p)} and p are an equilibrium of the lobbying stage of the carbon securities game;
that is
(i) each contribution function maximizes the joint welfare of the group’s members given the
carbon price and the other groups contribution function
(ii) carbon price p maximizes the government’s objective taking the contribution function as
given
Proposition 5. (C∗B, C
∗
E, pS) is an equilibrium of the lobbying stage if and only if
a) C∗E, C
∗
B are feasible
b) pS maximizes CB(p) + CE(p)− θF (p)
c) pS maximizes WB(p)− θF (p; I) + CE(p)
d) there exists a pB that maximizes WG(p) such that C
∗
B(p
B) = 0
e) pS maximizes WE(p)− θF (p) + CB(p)
f) there exists a pE that maximizes WG(p) such that C
∗
E(p
E) = 0
Proof. See Proposition 4.
Proof of Equation (8). Uniqueness under truthful strategies follows directly from Proposi-
tions 5 and the definition of truthful strategy. With truthful contributions,
CB(p) = WB(p)−BB (9)
and
CE(p) = WE(p)−BE (10)
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so that conditions (b), (c) and (e) lead to the same first order condition. Next, substitute
the relevant terms. The government chooses pS to maximize
−pΠ′(p)− ξn− θF (p) + Π(p) (11)
Therefore, the first order condition that characterizes the equilibrium of the carbon securities
is θF ′(p) = −pΠ′′(p).
Proof of Proposition 2. Similar to the proof of Proposition 1. For all p ≥ 0, marginal cam-
paign contributions −pΠ′′(p) ≤ 0. It follows from the properties of the F that pT < pS.
A.3 Equilibrium Carbon Price if some Carbon-Using Firm Hold Securities
Suppose that αm firms each purchase 1
αm
n securities and the remaining (1 − α)m firms do
not purchase any securities. The two groups of firms have different preferences, therefore it
makes sense for them to form separate lobbies. Each lobby attempts to affect the carbon
price in their favor. Their gross of contributions payoff of the (1 − α)m firms that did not
purchase any carbon securities is
WE(1−α)(p) = (1− α)Π(p) (12)
and the gross of contributions payoff of the αm firms that purchased carbon securities is
WEα(p) = αΠ(p)− (1− α)pΠ′(p)− ξn. (13)
The government maximizes the weighted difference of campaign contributions and cost of
deviating from voters’ opinion. WG denotes the welfare of the government:
WG(p) = CE(1−α)(p) + CEα(p)− θF (p) (14)
The first order condition describing the equilibrium is
αΠ′(p)− (1− α)pΠ′′(p)− θF ′(p) = 0. (15)
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Recall from Equations (7) and (8) that the equilibrium condition characterizing the first
order condition of the tax game (equivalent to α = 1) is
Π′(p)− θF ′(p) = 0 (16)
and the first order condition of the carbon securities game (α = 0) is
−pΠ′′(p)− θF ′(p) = 0. (17)
Therefore the equilibrium price in the case considered here, pαS, satisfies pT ≤ pαS ≤ pS.
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